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Abstract The paper presents a bioeconomics theory of homogeneous middleman
groups (HMGs) as adaptive units as well as empirical evidence in the form of a num-
ber of historical case studies of HMGs functioning as adaptive units in less-developed
economies lacking infrastructure. The evidence presented is not new: most of the case
studies have been published [Landa (in Jenkins (Ed.) The informal sector: Including
the excluded, 1988)]. What is new, however, is analyzing the phenomena of HMGs in a
new way—as adaptive units viewed from a group selection perspective. In doing so, the
case studies in this paper present empirical evidence of the existence and importance
of group selection in human society.
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1 Introduction
In a ‘Letter to the Editors’ of the Journal of Bioeconomics, biologist David Sloan
Wilson (2000, pp. 272–273) wrote:
Target paper.
J. T. Landa (B)
Department of Economics, York University, 4700 Keele Street , Toronto, ON, Canada M3J 1P3
e-mail: jlanda@Yorku.ca
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I read your paper (Landa 1999b) and enjoyed it. It fits very nicely with my
new book on religion from a multilevel evolutionary perspective….The main
purpose of my book (Wilson 2002) …. is to examine the concept of religious
groups as adaptive units….My empirical evidence is based mostly on detailed
case studies of single religions in relation to their environments. The next step
in the empirical study of religion is to become more broadly comparative. Not
only should religion x have certain features to be adaptive in a given environ-
ment, but all religions occupying the same environment should converge on
the same adaptive features. Against this background, the comparative study
of middleman societies becomes especially important. If the Jews in medi-
eval Europe, the Chinese in Southeast Asia, the East Indians in East Asia,
etc. are all alike in some respects based on group-level adaptation to sim-
ilar social environments, this is a very, very important example of conver-
gent cultural evolution that needs to be showcased to demonstrate the power
of the evolutionary perspective—both theory and empirical methods—
for understanding religious groups in particular and all human groups in
general.
This paper is a response to Wilson’s (2000) letter. I present empirical evidence in
the form of a number of case studies of homogeneous middleman groups (HMGs)
operating in less-developed economies in various parts of the world to showcase the
empirical reality of HMGs functioning as adaptive units; hence presenting very impor-
tant empirical evidence of the existence and importance of group selection in human
society. But before doing so, it is necessary to revisit the evolution of my theory of
the ‘ethnically homogeneous middleman group’ (EHMG) and link it with Wilson’s
discussion of human social groups as adaptive units, viewed from a group selection
framework.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the evolution of my economic
theory of the EHMG: from a theory of the emergence of the EHMG as an institu-
tional arrangement for the provision of contract enforcement, a local public good, to
a signaling theory of homogeneous middleman groups (HMGs) in which symbols of
individual and group identity play an important role in sorting potential trading partners
into homogeneous middleman groups, to a theory of HMGs as carriers and transmitters
of culture, to my current bioeconomics theory of HMGs as adaptive units viewed from
the perspective of group selection theory drawn from evolutionary biology. Section 3
provides a brief discussion of the link between group selection theory and multilevel
selection theory. Section 4 provides evidence of HMGs as adaptive units in the form of a
number of case studies showing how various successful foreign merchant groups, orig-
inating from very different cultures, have adapted to the same underdeveloped econo-
mies of their host societies. Although the evidence comes from very different sources,
it is striking how much these HMGs have in common, based on group-level adaptations
to similar environmental conditions. Section 5 provides a summary and concluding
comments.
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2 A theory of homogeneous middleman groups as adaptive units: The evolution
of an idea
2.1 A theory of the emergence of an ethnically homogeneous middleman group
(EHMG) as a ‘club-like’ institution for contract-enforcement (Landa 1981)
Based on my fieldwork on the Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia, I developed
a theory of the ethnically homogeneous Chinese middleman group (EHMG) as a
club-like arrangement in which Chinese traders within the group cooperated by
providing themselves with club goods/local public goods such as contract enforce-
ment, capital and information, in response to an environment lacking basic infra-
structure such as legal infrastructure, banking and credit-rating institutions. By
cooperating with each other, members of the EHMG were able to enforce contracts,
mobilize information and capital, thereby reducing transactions costs, hence out-
competing other ethnic groups to appropriate the role of middleman-entrepreneur
(Landa 1978).
Of the various club goods provided by members of the EHMG, the most impor-
tant is contract enforcement. I developed a theory of the emergence of the EHMG as
a club-like institutional arrangement for coping with the problem of contract uncer-
tainty (Landa 1981, reprinted in Landa 1994, Chap. 5). I argued that under conditions
of contract uncertainty, Chinese merchants will not randomly enter into transactions
with anonymous traders, but will have the incentive to preferentially choose traders
whom they trust, hence particularizing exchange relations on the basis of kinship,
locality and ethnic ties. This is because embedded in these particularistic exchange
relations are shared social norms of behavior (Confucian ethics of reciprocity) which
function to constrain traders from breach of contract; any trader who violates the eth-
ics of the group will be punished, including being ostracized from the group. The
effects of many individual trader’s discriminatory choice of trading partners is the
emergence of an ethnically homogeneous middleman group (EHMG), a club-like
arrangement alternative to contract law for economizing on contract enforcement
costs in an environment characterized by contract uncertainty. Greif (1993) devel-
oped a very similar theory for the Maghribi-Jewish merchants in medieval trade.
See also Tilly’s (2005, pp. 8–9) discussion of Landa’s and Greif’s work on ‘identity
networks’.
The ethnic boundary of the Chinese middleman group represents the outer lim-
its of a Chinese trader’s discriminatory choice of trading partners because of the
Confucian code of ethics which prescribes rules of the game—mutual aid obliga-
tions/reciprocity—for members of the same ethnic/dialect group, while not extending
mutual aid to outsiders. Constraints on behavior thus exist among members of the
Chinese EHMG because of shared rules of the game; members of the Chinese mid-
dleman group thus form a moral community. Confucian code of ethics serves as an
informal institution, an extralegal institutional arrangement for the enforcement of
contracts.
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2.2 Signaling theory of HMGs: Rituals, customs and symbols of individual
and group identity (Carr and Landa 1983)
Carr and Landa (1983) extended Landa’s (1981) theory of the EHMG to other homo-
geneous middleman groups (HMGs) including religious trading groups such as Jewish
merchants in medieval Europe. Using Buchanan’s (1965) theory of clubs, we depicted
the optimal size of homogenous trading clubs by analyzing the economic benefits
(lowered breach costs) and costs (enforcement and information costs) of belonging to
a homogenous trading club, arguing that the economic benefits out-weighed the costs
for a club member. We also explained many seemingly strange rituals and customs
of trading groups such as Jewish dietary laws, Jews lending to fellow Jews at zero
interest, Chinese keeping genealogical records, distinctive dress style, etc., as rational
trading practices. First, we use signaling theory to argue that these rituals, customs
and other symbols of religious or group identity—such as names, clan names, dietary
rules, language, dress, and religion—play an important signaling function in trans-
mitting non-price information of the identity of potential trading partners, and hence
serve to economize on information costs of identifying each other. Secondly, we argue
that these symbols and rituals of group identity screen out outsiders by erecting bar-
riers to entry for those outsiders who may wish to free-ride on the benefits of club
membership. We analyze these two functions of group rituals, and other symbols of
group identity by analyzing, for example, Jewish dietary laws:
….Jews have a stringent set of dietary laws known as the kashruth. Why do mem-
bers of these religious organizations restrict their eating behavior when there
seem to be no apparent benefits from doing so? We argue that there are benefits.
Dietary laws give religious members a feeling of shared values. These shared
values give members of the religious organizations a sense of a common identity
and distinguish them from non-members. It is exactly this difference between
members and nonmembers that is needed to facilitate economic exchange under
conditions of contract uncertainty….Dietary laws also help identity club mem-
bers, an especially important function if club members are geographically dis-
persed. Dietary laws discourage conversion by increasing the costs of joining
the organization and thus serve as a barrier against those seeking to become
members in order to receive the economic benefits (Carr and Landa, 1983, p.
153–154). See also Iannaccone (1992) who developed a very similar theory of
the function of religious rituals.
In addition, Carr and Landa analyzed the optimal size of the ethnic trading club/
network as the club expands to include increasing number of insiders while excluding
outsiders from the ethnic trade network.
Cooter and Landa (1984) extended Carr and Landa’s (1983) formal club-theoretic
model of the HMG one step further by analyzing the relationship between the size
of trading groups and the development of the law of contracts. We think of a trading
group as an informal club-like arrangement for reducing breach of contract between
members. If the group expands, then members gain the advantage of a more extensive
internal market. On the other hand, as the group expands, personal relations become
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attenuated. For a given level of expenditure by the group on enforcement, the proba-
bility of breach will increase as the group becomes larger. We prove that membership
in clubs will decline if contracts with outsiders become more secure i.e. when contract
law becomes better developed.
Recently, Bowles and Gintis (2004) developed a theory of trust embedded in ‘paro-
chial’ ethnic networks very similar to that developed by Landa (1981), Carr and Landa
(1983), and Cooter and Landa (1984).
2.3 A theory of HMGs as ‘cultural bearing’ and ‘cultural transmission’ units
(Landa 1991)
Once HMGs emerges, what factors account for the persistence of ethnic trading bound-
aries? The answer lies in viewing a HMG explicitly as a ‘cultural-bearing unit’, anthro-
pologist Barth’s (1969) concept of an ethnic group—instead of implicitly as in the Carr
and Landa (1983) paper—and as a ‘cultural transmission unit’ (Landa 1991), follow-
ing Boyd and Richerson’s (1985) theory of co-evolution of genes and culture or ‘dual
inheritance theory’, which focuses on the importance of cultural group selection.
In Landa’s (1991) paper, a HMG is viewed explicitly as a ‘cultural bearing’ unit
because members use symbols of individual and group identity, including physiog-
nomic indicators, to convey low cost non-price information of a trader’s reputation
for trustworthiness to potential trading partners who are members of their own ethnic
group. At the same time, these symbols of group identity erect barriers to entry for
outsiders who may wish to ‘pass’ as insiders in order to improve their status by free-
riding on the benefits of group membership. Such passing include changing names and
religious conversion. But an outsider from a very different ethnic/racial group cannot
change his ethnicity because ethnicity involves immutable physical characteristics. It
is very costly for a person from a different ethnic group to switch ethnic identities.
Switching an identity via assimilation is a long-term process, the ‘costs of ethnic iden-
tity switching are so prohibitive, both in the short and long run, ethnicity imposes an
effective barrier for those attempting to pass as insiders’ (Landa 1991, p. 66). I com-
pared ethnicity as a hard-to-fake ethnic marker which is analogous to the peacock’s
elaborate tail discussed by biologists (e.g., Hamilton and Zuk 1989) as performing
two important functions: ‘as identification of conspecifics, and as a screening device
to screen out the weak, or cheaters/fakers’ (Landa 1999a, p. 105).
Once the HMG emerges, the HMG functions as a ‘cultural transmission unit’ which
operates to maintain the HMG over time. I developed a theory of the HMG as a cultural
transmission unit, using Boyd and Richerson’s (1980, 1985) ‘dual inheritance theory’
of genes and culture:
Since many of the family firms of the deceased middlemen will be passed on to
sons, social learning of the culture of the middleman group takes place through
docility and ‘frequency-dependent bias’—sons copying the behavior of their
fathers—without the need for costly trial-and-error learning. The next genera-
tion can also copy those middlemen-entrepreneurs who are especially successful
and have emerged to assume roles as leaders and philanthropists in their own
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community. Since the enculturation process of social learning also goes on in
the wider ethnic community of which the EHMG is a subgroup, new members
of the ethnic group will also inherit the cultural values of the group. The rules of
the game and other cultural values governing members of the present generation
of middlemen, then, will be transmitted via social learning from one generation
to the next….Ethnocentrism of members of the EHMG is reinforced; those who
are already in the middleman group will continue to prefer to choose new trad-
ing partners from the younger generation of the same ethnic group (Landa 1991,
p. 69–70).
HMGs function as ‘cultural transmission units’ because wealthy members of the HMG
play an important role in providing certain local public goods, including education to
fellow members, and because group cultural values are transmitted to future genera-
tions of the ethnic group via teaching (in schools and in the family) and learning from
peers. The ethnic boundaries of trading networks thus persist over time because of: (1)
the ‘conformist transmission’ bias, i.e. copying from peers, etc. (Boyd and Richerson
1985); and (2) the ‘efficiency’ of the HMGs as a cultural bearing unit, and as a cultural
transmission unit, using the concept of efficiency as defined by bioeconomist Jack
Hirshleifer (1982, p. 50):
On all levels of life organisms have found it profitable to come together in pat-
terns of cooperative association. But such cooperation is always secondary and
contingent, in at least two respects: (1) in-group cooperation is only a means for
more effectively and ruthlessly competing against outsiders, and (2) even within
the group there will not be perfect parallelism of interests, hence cooperation
must generally be supported by sanctions….Efficiency, in this interpretation, is
meaningful only as a measure of group strength or advantage relative to com-
peting groups in the struggle for life and resources…..A totally universalistic
measure of efficiency is pointless; we must draw the line somewhere, at the
boundary of ‘us’ and ‘them.’
Hirshleifer’s concept of ‘group competition’, ignored in conventional economics, is
crucial to my explanation of the emergence and persistence of EHMGs: ‘In the ruth-
less competitive inter-ethnic struggle for profit opportunities, in-group members with
efficient social structures for the enforcement of cultural norms of behavior have a
comparative advantage over other ethnic groups in appropriating and maintaining
middleman-entrepreneurial roles for themselves (Landa 1991, p. 71). By 1991, using
Hirshleifer’s concept of efficiency and group competition, I came very close to devel-
oping a bioeconomics theory of the HMG as an adaptive unit. But that theory still took
some years to materialize. In the interim, I came across biologist Alexander’s (1987)
theory of the origins of moral systems:
Moral systems are societies with rules. Rules are agreements or understanding
about what is permitted and what is not, about what rewards and punishments
are likely for specific acts, about what is right and wrong. I will argue that
the concepts of moral systems have been designed to assist group members and
explicitly not to assist the members of other competing groups. [Emphasis added]
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Alexander (p. 79) argued that inter-group competition promotes in-group cooperation
via the role of moral systems: ‘[H]umans alone play competitive group against group
on a large and complex scale.’ Moral systems, rules or institutions thus divide human
society into groups: ‘us’ vs. ‘them’, ‘insiders’ vs. ‘outsiders’. This ethnocentric pro-
pensity of humans to cognitively classify people into ‘us’ and ‘them’ led me to develop
a classificatory theory of HMGs, and to coin the term ‘Homo classificus’ for humans
(Landa 2002).
It was not until I read Sober and Wilson’s (1998) book that I developed a bio-
economics theory of Chinese middleman success and placed it explicitly on group
selection-bioeconomics foundations (Landa 1999b). And not until I read Wilson’s
(2000) commentary on my paper, that I realized that I have sufficient number of case
studies of various middlemen group-level adaptations to similar underdeveloped envi-
ronment in various parts of the world (Landa 1988). So even though the empirical
evidence of HMGs functioning as adaptive units was in front of my face for over a
decade, I could not see it until many years later.1 And I am sure that I would never
have seen it, if it were not for the fact that I had crossed over from the social sciences
to evolutionary biology, that I was able to interpret HMGs in a new way, as adaptive
units.
2.4 A bioeconomics theory of homogeneous middleman groups (HMGs)
as adaptive units viewed from a group selection perspective
In order to develop a bioeconomics theory of HMGs as adaptive units, it is necessary to
understand the meaning of ‘adaptation’ and also the meaning of a ‘group’ as an adap-
tive unit from the perspective of multilevel selection theory. (For a brief discussion of
the distinction between the concepts of group selection and multilevel selection, see
Sect. 3) In evolutionary biology, ‘adaptation’ is defined as ‘the process populations
of organisms acquire properties that allow them to survive and reproduce more effec-
tively, by being able to cope with their environment’ (Ghiselin, e-mail communication,
April 1, 2008). Stated more generally, ‘…adaptation designates any process whereby
a structure is progressively modified to give better performance in its environment.
The structures may range from a protein molecule to a horse’s foot or a human brain
or, even, to an interacting group of organisms such as the wildlife of the African veldt’
(Holland 1975, Preface, p. v).
A group is defined as ‘a set of individuals that influence each other’s fitness with
respect to a certain trait but not the fitness of those outside the group’ (Sober and
Wilson 1998, p. 92). When the trait is a social behavior, Wilson (2002, p. 15) says that
‘the fitness of an individual is determined by its own trait and the traits of the individ-
uals with whom it interacts, coining the term ‘trait group’ (Wilson 1975) to emphasize
the close relationship between traits and groups in multilevel selection theory. More
generally, a trait group is defined ‘in terms of the individuals who interact with respect
1 As (Wilson 2002, p. 133) so aptly puts it: ‘There are certain things in front of our faces, and our challenge
is to discover the theoretical framework.’ The real life phenomena of HMGs in various parts of the world
sharing the same traits in response to the same environment can be viewed afresh from the theoretical
perspective of multilevel selection theory.
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to a given activity’ (Wilson 2002, p. 15).2 Thus ‘my bowling group is the people
with whom I bowl, my study group is the people with whom I study…(Wilson 2002,
p. 15).
In the case of the homogeneous middleman group, it is a network of interdepen-
dent middlemen linked to each other directly and indirectly by particularistic ties of
kinship, locality, and ethnicity.
In order to understand a human group as an adaptive unit, Wilson (2002, p. 25) says
that it is necessary to ‘go beyond kin selection and reciprocity to model a complex
regulatory system that binds members of a group into a functional unit.’3 Wilson’s
emphasis on the importance of ‘complex regulatory systems’ such as social norms (see
Sober and Wilson 1998, Chaps. 4 and 5) reflects an emerging biology paradigm of
major-life-transitions in which members of groups, through regulatory mechanisms,
suppress conflict/free-riding within the group, thus allowing group members to coop-
erate for their collective benefit—without undue self-sacrifice (‘altruism’) of it mem-
bers—hence the group’s success in out-competing other groups.4 Wilson’s emphasis
on ‘complex regulatory systems’ is to be understood in the context of his discussion
of multilevel selection theory which focuses not only on within-group cooperation,
but also importantly on between-group competition. Wilson’s multilevel selection
perspective revives group selection theory, albeit in its rehabilitated form.
The ‘complex regulatory system’ that Wilson refers to is equivalent to the concept of
‘institutions’—formal and informal ‘rules of the game’—central to New Institutional
Economics (see Landa 1994, Chap. 1). An example of a formal institution is contract
law. Examples of informal institutions are social norms, ethical codes of conduct,
religion, etc.
By 1999, I was able to develop what essentially is a bioeconomics theory of the
HMGs as adaptive units incorporating the following essential elements (Landa 1999b):
(a) An immigrant group responds to the existence of an economic opportunity or an
economic niche—for example, opportunities for middleman-entrepreneurship—
in the host country;
(b) The immigrant group is a minority ethnic group co-existing side by side with
other ethnic groups—including the indigenous population—who are potential
competitors for occupying the middleman niche;
(c) The infrastructure necessary for entrepreneurship—contract law, banking, credit-
rating institutions—is poorly developed or non-existent;
2 I thank David Sloan Wilson for sending me a galley proof copy of his book (Wilson 2002) prior to the
book’s publication.
3 Wilson identifies three mechanisms for achieving in-group cooperation: kinship, reciprocity, and social
norms. For additional pathways to cooperation, see Hirshleifer (1999).
4 For an example of major transitions paradigm in evolutionary biology, see Michod (1997). Michod studies
the transition in evolution ‘from cells to multicellular organisms, saying that ‘the two issues considered
are applicable to all major transitions in the units of evolution that share two themes: the emergence of
cooperation and the regulation of conflict among the lower-level units, in this case cells’ (p. 607). Michod
says that ‘the major transitions in evolution are from individual genes to networks of genes, from gene
networks to bacteria-like cells, from bacteria-like cells to eukaryotic cells with organelles, from cells to
multicellular organisms, and from solitary organisms to societies’ (p. 607).
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(d) To be successful in middleman-entrepreneurial role, middlemen must be able to
provide themselves with infrastructure by providing themselves with club goods;
(e) Several club goods such as contract enforcement, provision of capital and infor-
mation can be obtained by middlemen only if there is cooperation and coordina-
tion among middlemen functioning as an adaptive unit, in response to the poorly
developed infrastructure;
(f) By forming a HMG, with members connected by kinship, ethnic, religious and
other personalistic ties, social norms exist among members of the HMG to facil-
itate cooperation and collective action for the provision of club goods;
(g) Members of HMGs, by cooperating and coordinating their activities, by providing
themselves with club goods, can out-compete other ethnic groups to appropriate
middleman roles;
(h) By transmitting cultural values of trustworthiness and cooperation to the next
generation of middleman, HMGs can persist over time.
(i) The persistence of HMGs—with ethnic boundaries separating ‘us/insiders’ from
‘them/outsiders’ is a source of inter-ethnic conflict and violence in multi-racial
societies. See also Corning’s (2007) bioeconomics theory of collective violence
in non-human and human societies.
3 Current status of group selection theory and multilevel selection theory
Group selection (GS) and multilevel selection (MLS) are closely related but not
identical concepts. In two important recent articles aimed at rethinking the old con-
troversies surrounding GS theory since the 1960s, Wilson and Wilson (2007, p. 345;
2008), concluded with a summary of sociobiology’s new theoretical foundation: ‘Self-
ishness beats altruism [read: cooperation (my emphasis)] within groups. Altruistic
groups beat selfish groups.’
It is clear that MLS theory focuses on at least two biological levels of selection and
multiple groups in a population structure:
(a) a lower level ‘individual selection’ or ‘within-group selection’ where unrestrained
free-riders/cheaters/selfish genes by maximizing their relative fitness within the
group outcompete cooperative members; and
(b) a higher level selection, ‘between-group selection’, where cooperative groups
(using social controls to restrain free-riders), favors behaviors that increase the
relative fitness of the whole group, hence outcompete selfish groups. MLS theory
allows for the possibility that adaptations can evolve above the level of individ-
ual organisms, i.e. at the level of social groups and other higher level units, and
hence according to Wilson and Wilson (2007, p. 336), Dawkins’ (1976) ‘selfish
gene’ paradigm that the individual gene is the fundamental and the sole unit of
selection is wrong.
On the other hand, GS theory focuses on the ‘between-group selection’ level—
the evolution of cooperative traits—in which cooperative groups outcompete selfish
groups. The logic of GS theory is thus embedded in a larger and more comprehen-
sive MLS theoretical framework, a framework which is likened to a series of nested
Russian dolls (Wilson and Wilson 2008, p. 380).
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Wilson and Wilson (2007, p. 339) says that despite the controversial history of MLS
theory, that the theory is an accepted theoretical framework for the study of ‘major tran-
sitions’—e.g. single cells evolving into multi-celled organisms, honeybees evolving
into the eusociality (i.e. extra high sociality) of honeybee colonies5—where selection
within groups is suppressed, thus allowing selection among groups to emerge.
It is important to emphasize for bioeconomists, that GS and MLS theories are socio-
biological theories of biological evolution that emphasize natural selection which
is based on survival and reproduction expressed in biological terms of relative fit-
ness comparisons. Such relative fitness comparisons have no conceptual counterparts
in economics when discussing the evolution of the firm, industry, markets, etc. As
Metcalfe (2008, p. 25) states: ‘economic evolution is not biological evolution for [there
is] nothing in the economic world to correspond to the exact processes of biological
inheritance, sexual reproduction and gene transmission over time.’ However the basic
GS theoretical framework can still provide a powerful bioeconomics framework for
understanding how one trading group comes to dominate middleman-entrepreneurial
roles: If traders can form a homogeneous middleman group and can cooperate and
coordinate their collective efforts in the provision of local public goods, and are able,
via social controls and social norms, to punish selfish individuals (free-riders in the
group who wish to benefit from public goods without contributing), then the trading
group can outcompete other less cooperative groups, in functioning as a group-related
adaptive unit in providing public goods for group members, hence able to appropri-
ate and maintain the role of middleman-entrepreneur. As Wilson and Wilson (2007,
p. 343) noted: ‘The psychological traits associated with human moral systems are
comparable to the mechanisms that suppress selection within groups for other major
transitions, such as chromosomes and the rules of meiosis within multicellular organ-
isms and policing mechanisms with eusocial insect colonies.’ This is exactly the group
selection framework that is used in Sect. 2.4 of my bioeconomics theory of HMGs as
adaptive units.6
Once the HMG emerges, cultural group selection plays an important role in helping
the HMG to persist over time via its role in transmission of social norms to future gen-
erations of middleman. Here, the theory of gene-culture co-evolution associated with
the work of Lumsden and Wilson (1981, revised and expanded 2005 edition) and Boyd
and Richerson’s (1985, Richerson and Boyd 2005) ‘dual inheritance theory’ are rele-
vant, although in Sect. 2.3 of this paper, my focus is exclusively on Boyd-Richerson’s
dual inheritance theory emphasizing cultural group selection.7
Wilson and Wilson’s (2007, especially 2008) articles also provided empirical evi-
dence for group selection mostly drawn from non-human societies. The next section
of the paper will provide empirical evidence for the existence of group selection in
human societies in the form of a number of case studies of HMGs.
5 For the bioeconomics of honeybee scouts using the unanimity voting rule for collective choice of a new
nest, see Landa (1986).
6 For the bioeconomics literature on group selection, see Buchanan (2000), Rubin (2000), and Gifford Jr.
(2000).
7 My paper does not address biological group selection which, according to Field (2001, 2008), needs to
be included in a comprehensive theory of human behavior.
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4 Homogeneous middleman groups (HMGs) as adaptive units:
Some case studies
This section provides empirical evidence–in the form of several case studies—that
successful trading groups are adaptive units with shared traits in common. The fol-
lowing are brief summaries of mostly prior work on case studies of merchants in
various parts of the world, either based on my own fieldwork (Landa 1978, 1983) or
drawn from the studies by other scholars (Landa 1988).8
4.1 Chinese middlemen in Southeast Asia (Landa 1978, 1981, 1983, 1988)
The marketing of smallholders’ rubber in West Malaysia is dominated by a partic-
ular Chinese ethnic/dialect group—Hokkien-Chinese traders—who function as mid-
dlemen between smallholders (largely indigenous Malay population ) and overseas
buyers. In 1967 there were 2,240 licensed rubber dealers in West Malaysia. Mem-
bers of the middleman group were arranged in a pyramidal marketing structure with
specialization and division of labor among the different levels of middlemen: village
dealers, town dealers, and packers/exporters.
A closer scrutiny of the Chinese middleman group in Singapore and West Malay-
sia revealed the existence of a tightly knit ethnically homogeneous Hokkien-Chinese
group. Within the Hokkien-Chinese group, five clans from Chuan-chow and Yung-
chung counties in Fukien province in China—Tan, Lee, Ng, Lim, and Gan—dominated
the marketing network. The Hokkien ethnic community is the most wealthy and pow-
erful of the five major Chinese ethnic/dialect groups (Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese,
Hakka, and Hainanese) by virtue of their dominance of the smallholders’ rubber trade
(see Landa 1978, Chap. 3; 1988). Of the Tan clan in Southeast Asia, Tan Kah Kee
emerged to become the ‘Rubber King’ by 1925. Using part of his profits from his busi-
ness enterprises, Tan Kah Kee, as ‘Rubber King’ and as leader of the Hokkien Huay
Kuan (the Hokkien dialect association), engaged in philanthropy by financing the pro-
vision of much needed local public goods such as elementary and middle schools and
the Amoy University for fellow villagers and fellow Hokkiens in his native province
of Fukian as well as schools for fellow Hokkiens in Singapore. See Landa and Salaff
(1980, 1986 revised).
Interviews that I conducted with a number of Hokkien rubber dealers in Singapore
and West Malaysia revealed the importance of the role of kinship and ethnic ties as a
basis for establishing mutual trust and the informal sanctions that operated to enforce
contracts. One rubber dealer said:
Because of the risks involved in advancing money without security, based purely
on trust, we tend to trade with those whom we trust; they are often kinsmen,
friends, people from the same place in China and those who speak the same dia-
lect. Because of the longer association of Hokkiens with each other in the rubber
8 The case studies not included in Landa (1988) are: Chinese merchants in People’s Republic of China
(Sect. 4.2); Indian merchants in India: the Jains-Marawari traders (Sect. 4.3), and Indian traders in South
Africa (Sect. 4.5).
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industry, we find it easier to give credit to a fellow-Hokkien because there are
ways of finding out the creditworthiness of that person–about his background,
his associates, his ethical code and so on (Landa 1983, p. 90–91).
The ‘ethical code’ refers to the traditional Confucian code of ethics which overseas
Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia have adapted to their new homeland where the
Chinese community as a whole constitute an ethnic minority amongst the Malay major-
ity. Beyond the role of ethics embedded in particularistic exchange relations, social
sanctions existed for punishing those who deliberately breach the trust of their trad-
ing partners: shaming a person, withdrawal of credit, and ostracism from the trading
network (Landa 1981, 1988, pp. 83–84).
The following case which I obtained from an interview with a rubber dealer dra-
matically reveals a Chinese rubber dealer’s attitude towards those who do not abide
by the rules of the game of the group:
Mr. X was sued by his creditors. He was unable to pay his debts. To make matters
worse, he showed contempt and spite towards his creditors. Mr. Y, a creditor,
was very angry with his debtor. He was on a business trip to Hong Kong but flew
back to Singapore to attend the court case. The case was initiated by the whole
group of creditors. Mr. Y said that the case involve only a few thousand dollars.
But he was willing to pay for the trip back to Singapore and then return to Hong
Kong to finish his business deal. The airfare plus lawyers’ fees all added up to a
significant amount. In fact he lost more money by prosecuting the debtor. But he
did it simply because the debtor did not show respect for the principles of Chi-
nese methods of conducting business. When he could not pay his debt, instead
of attempting to remedy the situation, he worsened it by showing contempt for
his creditors. Mr. Y said, ‘this man is not suitable to remain in the business com-
munity; he does not deserve cooperation or help from his colleagues’ (Landa
1988, p. 94)
This case study provides an excellent example of prosocial behavior in the form of
‘altruistic punishment’ (Fehr and Gächter 2002) in which an individual in an ethnic
trading network is willing to punish another individual in the same network, at a cost
to himself by ostracizing the offending party from the Chinese business network.
4.2 Chinese merchants in People’s Republic of China (Watson 1988)
Since embarking on an ambitious program of economic reforms in 1978, the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) has enjoyed a degree of success in making the transition
from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented economy. The major economic
reform took place in rural China with the introduction of the Household Responsibility
System (HRS). The HRS de-collectivized people’s communes by reintroducing the
family farm. Farmers, after fulfilling their government quota, have the right to sell
their surplus in private markets where prices are higher. As a result of the HRS the
number of rural and urban markets increased, and with it the emergence of a network of
middlemen connecting rural with urban markets. Watson noted the existence of social
and cultural ties between the newly emergent network of middlemen. I interpreted the
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existence of homogeneous particularistic network of middlemen as a response to the
environment of contract uncertainty in PRC’s transition to a market-oriented economy
(Landa 1998).
4.3 Indian merchants in India: the Jains-Marwari traders (Iyer 1999; Laidlaw 1995)
Iyer’s (1999) paper outlines some fundamental features of dominant Indian merchant
groups, focusing especially on the Jains-Marwari traders. The Indian merchant com-
munity as a whole belongs to the Vaishyas caste, one of the four hierarchically ranked
Hindu castes in descending order of status: the Brahmins (priests), the Kshtrigas (war-
riors), the Vaishyas (traders), and the Sundras (peasants and laborers). Besides caste
homogeneity, the Hindu merchant communities are subdivided into merchant groups
according to their place of origin.
The dominant merchant communities are the Marwaris, traders who originated
from Marwar in Northwest India, and the Gujaratis originating from Western India,
including Bombay. Marwari merchant communities are further sub-divided into vari-
ous smaller more tightly-knit homogeneous ‘jatis’ (family descent) ‘the endogamous
hereditary and named social groups…’ (p. 104) ‘It is the jati…that clearly identifies
the social group to which a particular merchant belongs…(p. 104). And it is the orga-
nization of the merchants into jatis, that led to the establishment of codes of conduct
for each jati, which ‘translates into strong sources of credit’ (p. 107).
Furthermore, Marwari traders are united by a common religion, Jainism, a religion
which ‘not unlike Buddhism, prescribes definite codes of conduct for monks and la-
ities alike and the laity is expected to follow ‘lesser vows’ comparable to the ‘great
vows of the ascetic’ (Iyer p. 106). An ascetic lifestyle, however, is not inconsistent
with the accumulation of wealth, as Iyer (p. 106) explains: ‘The frugal Jain lifestyle
and inner-worldly asceticism finds parallels with Weber’s “Protestant Ethic”.’ See also
Wilsons’s (2004) discussion of the relationship between Jainism and Jain merchants.
And indeed, I might add: it is this ‘Protestant ethic’ with its emphasis on asceticism
together with the concept of ‘calling’, that Weber used to develop this theory to explain
why Protestants, and not Catholics, dominated entrepreneurial roles in Europe.
In India, wealthy merchants are also very religious: they contribute generously to
donations to temples, social and other educational institutions (p. 106), This in turn
increase their reputation in the merchant community. A merchant who has a good
reputation is able to access informal financial credit and market information (p. 109).
Wealthy Jains merchants dominate the emerald gem export market. They extend credit
to each other, and use the hundi, a kind of promissory note whose use requires a great
deal of trust. Loss of credit and reputation results if a dealer did not pay the debt in
full and upon demand (Laidlaw 1995, p. 354; see also Wilson 2004).
A merchant family’s good credit and reputation is also facilitated by good arranged
marriage alliances (Laidlaw 1995, p. 335). The result of personalized exchanges,
based on ties of jati, caste, locality and religion, among Jains-Marwari merchants is
that, ‘Jain businessmen throughout India and beyond have consistently fit into partic-
ular commercial niches and making use of ready-made networks of credit and social
relationships…’ [(Iyer, p. 108 citing Dundas (1992, p. 169)].
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4.4 Indian merchants in Central Africa (Dotson and Dotson 1968)
The largest single foreign ethnic group involved in the African trade as middlemen in
the l960s was the Indians. The Indians came from India to Africa through their early
connections with Arabs and Portuguese, and especially with the British. Because of
their historical ties with Britain, they are mostly found in British East and Central
Africa (Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi) than elsewhere in Africa.
The middleman role in Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi is dominated by Hindu Indi-
ans coming from peasant families in the Gujarat region in India. The group is tightly
knit, consisting of kinsmen bearing the surname of Patel associated with the Patidar
caste. There is a high degree of internal solidarity among the Patidar merchants not
only because of the existence of kinship ties but also of caste ties. In India, members
of Hindu society are born into a particular caste for which they have life-long mem-
bership and from which they cannot escape from their caste status. Each caste has its
own values and norms. With no option to cross caste boundaries, this means that the
Hindu caste code prescribes a high degree of mutual cooperation among caste mem-
bers. Dotson and Dotson (p. 66) explain why Indians in Central Africa were successful
in their middlemen roles: ‘The same culture provide them with normative basis for
effective social cooperation in small tightly knit kinship, caste and locality groups.’
The Gujarati Indians are especially prominent in the more profitable wholesale
African trade where almost all sales are made on credit. How do they minimize credit
default? Unlike the Europeans in Africa who resort to formal contracts in their business
dealings, the Indians use the status of kinship, caste and religion in their dealings with
each other to protect against credit risks. With increasing competition from African
traders at the retail level, Indian wholesalers are prepared to do business with African
retailers, but they fear the risks of credit default.
4.5 Indian traders in South Africa (Godsell 1991)
Godsell (1991) described the homogeneous network of Indian traders in South Africa
where Indian entrepreneurs were mainly Muslims. Family, religious and friendship
networks play an important role in Indian business success: Indian entrepreneurs
obtained import/export contacts as well as start up capital from family, friends and co-
religionists. The Indian businessman prefers to extend help, ‘first to a family member,
second to a coreligionist, third to another Indian’ (p. 87). Their success was due to
the fact that ‘they were able to draw on their religious, family, and ethnic resources to
overcome the obstacles placed in their way by legislative and social discrimination’
(p. 89).
4.6 The Lebanese traders in West Africa (Dotson and Dotson 1975)
The Lebanese traders came to West Africa around 1900. Dotson and Dotson (1975,
p. 589) comparing the Lebanese with the Indians, offer the following explanation of
Lebanese merchant success:
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Although quite different in major ethnological characteristics, these two Oriental
peoples were remarkably similar in those aspects of traditional culture and social
structure that predisposed them to success in business. Both, for example, pos-
sessed a family system extended beyond the immediate ‘nuclear’ unit of parents
and dependent offspring. The extended family is conducive to successful busi-
ness entrepreneurship in two ways. At the value level, the strong sense of obliga-
tion and family continuity inculcated by it helps to create and constantly reinforce
the future orientation that we have described as a shopkeeping prerequisite. Orga-
nizationally, on the other hand, the small, tightly knit unit so created provides
the foundation for co-operative action, capable of transcending the limitations
of either the capital resources or the functional capabilities of single individ-
uals. Particularly when initial resources are small, this capacity gives such a
group tremendous competitive advantages over isolated individuals....Indians
and Lebanese came from peasant villages, it is true; but as Orientals they also
came from societies in which commerce and trade were anciently established
and well-understood in principle, even by their peasant populations.
4.7 Jewish merchants in medieval Europe and elsewhere
4.7.1 Jewish merchants in medieval Europe (Zenner 1983)
Jews played a prominent role as merchants in long-distance Mediterranean trade in
the Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950–1350. In the long-distance trad-
ing networks, Jews played an indispensable role in the medieval city-state of Venice,
linking the Italian merchants with other foreign merchants who came to Venice to
trade during the heyday of the Venetian empire. According to Zenner (pp. 151–152)
the medieval development of the Jews as a trading diaspora—a network of dispersed
trading settlements—was made possible by the organization of trust over long dis-
tances:
… long-distance trade centered around family firms and often ethnically and
culturally homogeneous groups. Common ancestry, languages, and religion pro-
vided the basis for a moral community which could enforce ostracism (for exam-
ple, boycott, ex-communication) when no common territory existed....The fact
that such a moral community over long distances supports trade also reinforces
the diaspora as a whole, since the survival of the group depends on having
communications, distinctiveness, and a way of enforcing its norms over great
distances. Being involved in an occupation with other members of one’s group
means that your livelihood depends on your fellow kinsmen and co-ethnics
(co-religionists) and makes leaving the group more difficult.
4.7.2 Jews in Jerba, Tunisia (Udovitch and Valensi 1984)
By the first half of the eleventh century, Jews in Jerba emerged as a well-established
community. They participated in the Commercial Revolution of the Mediterranean
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world: they were engaged in trade that extended from Spain through Tunisia and
Sicily to Egypt and beyond to South Arabia and India. As part of the international
network, they traded not only with co-religionists from Tunisia and Egypt but also
with Italians from Amalfi, Genoa, and Venice who came to North Africa to trade.
Within Jerba, the Jews dominated two occupations, textiles and the jewelry trade.
It is precisely in the jewelry trade, where mutual trust is crucial between exchange
partners, that:
the clientalization of exchange does not cross ethnic boundaries but takes place
between the Jewish producers in the Jara and their co-religionists merchant-
distributors in the suq (p. 117).
Within the close-knit social and economic network, the mutual trust between the
jewelers are based on Jewish cultural and legal traditions. The Jews, according to Ud-
ovitch and Valensi, are ‘people of the law’ and adhere strictly to the law. The same
values of trust and integrity in business dealings among the jewelers, are also extended
to economic transactions across religious boundaries in economic transactions with
Muslims in the suq/market (Udovitch and Valensi p. 29).
Furthermore, Udovitch and Valensi (p. 111) pointed out the multiple roles the Jerban
Jewish jeweler played in the Jewish community:
….individual jeweler fulfill several functions in different spheres simultaneously.
A Jewish jeweler is not simply a jeweler; he may also be the head of a synagogue,
a part-time scribe, the community circumciser, or a member of the burial society.
In Jerba, possessing the skills to produce or sell jewelry is not enough to make one
a jeweler. One has, first and foremost, to find a place within a closely knit social
–even more than economic–network. Since similar rules govern other occupa-
tions, it is once again, according to ethnic, religious and communal affiliations
that the division of labor operates and perpetuates.
4.7.3 Jews in present-day Antwerp, Amsterdam and New York (Gutwirth 1968)
The number of Jews living in Antwerp, Belgium in 1966 was estimated to be 10,500 out
of a total population of 550,000. Antwerp, a major center of commerce and industry,
is one of the largest ports in the world. About 80% of the Jewish population dominated
the diamond industry, import–export trade and in the occupation of cleaving (trans-
forming rough diamond into brilliant ones). Diamond transactions require a great deal
of trust on the part of dealers because of the need to constantly bargain and negotiate
about the quality of diamonds transacted between buyers and sellers, and because of
the opportunities for theft and fraud. This explains why the diamond trade:
takes place within a comparatively close and limited group: the participants
(often linked by friendship) are formed into a loose type of association with its
own codes and sets of rules to which they adhere...Yiddish, a true lingua franca
of the diamond community emphasizes the confidential nature of the economic
arrangements (Gutwirth p. 133).
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The group involved in the diamond trade and industry is a highly homogeneous reli-
gious group whose members speak the same language, Yiddish (Gutwirth p. 124).
Within the group, there is a further specialization and division of labor along religious
lines: the export trade is dominated by the less orthodox Jews, while the ultra-orthodox
Hassidic Jews–identified by their long beards, sidelocks, gaberdines and fur hats–
dominate the import/local diamond markets.
Hassidic Jewish merchants in Antwerp, like the Jews in Jerba, played multiple
roles in their community: They played an important role in maintaining Jewish cul-
tural identity via dietary laws (kashrut) and other religious and ritual practices. Prom-
inent members of the diamond trade and industry were often also the leaders of the
various associations and cultural clubs whose functions include assisting immigrants
from Central Europe into Antwerp, promoting tsedake (charity and solidarity as it was
practiced in Central and Eastern Europe), as well as various cultural functions.
The same attributes of honesty and reliability in transactions explains why the dia-
mond trade in Amsterdam and in New York is dominated by a close-knit group of
Jews who conduct transactions among themselves without relying on the state for the
enforcement of contracts. For more recent empirical studies of diamond merchants in
New York, see Bernstein (1992), Richman (2006).9
5 Summary and conclusions
From the case studies of various successful merchant groups operating in underdevel-
oped countries and elsewhere in present-day Antwerp, Amsterdam and New York, we
observe that these successful middleman groups share the following adaptive charac-
teristics:
1. Middlemen belong to tightly-knit groups so that middleman exchange—with spe-
cialization and division of labor among middlemen—is characterized by person-
alistic exchange based on kinship, ethnic or religious ties. The greater the degree
of trust involved in transactions, the more homogeneous and tightly knit the HMG
becomes, e.g. the Yiddish-speaking Hassidic Jews dominate the diamond trade
in Antwerp and in New York, while the very religious Jains-Marawari traders
dominate the emerald gem trade.10
2. Kinship and ethnic ties, as well as shared social norms embedded in these HMGs
serve as constraints on the behavior of group members, and hence functioned to
provide members with club goods.
3. Wealthy members of the HMGs who are also leaders of their own ethnic commu-
nities, especially Chinese and Jewish merchants, played key roles in transmitting
cultural values to future generations of merchants via their roles in promoting
education, etc.
9 Even present day Jewish merchants engaged in diamond trade in Antwerp, Amsterdam, and New York
are HMGs. It is not that the legal framework is not well-developed, but because Jews long had a monopoly
of the diamond trade, a monopoly due to their ability to enforce contracts among themselves in the days
when contract law was not well-developed.
10 For many other HMGs in cross-cultural trade, see Curtin (1984).
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My empirical evidence on various HMGs—based on my own field work, and drawn
from other scholars’ historical and ethnographic studies, shows that not only the
Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia have adapted themselves to the environment
of underdevelopment by forming an ethnically homogeneous middleman group, with
shared Confucian social norms, so as to provide group members with club goods, but
other trading groups occupying similar environment of underdevelopment in other
parts of the world also converged on the same adaptive features. The formation of
HMGs, with social/religious norms embedded in these kinship and particularistic
trading networks, provide an important example of convergent cultural evolution, and
hence demonstrating the power of multilevel evolutionary perspective for understand-
ing homogeneous middleman groups functioning as adaptive units. The various case
studies of HMGs in this paper collectively demonstrate the existence and evidence of
the importance of cultural group selection in human society.
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